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I. INTRODUCTION
As technology advances, musical artists and the recording industry
face new challenges for protecting the copyrights of their works. Much of
the new technology is inexpensive and readily available on the Internet,
often at the expense of copyright protection. Online stores like
Amazon.com or bmgmusicservice.com, musical artist home pages, and
unofficial Web sites maintained by fans are some of the newest means
through which music aficionados may listen to and purchase music.
Unfortunately, despite the large number of legitimate sites over which
listeners may listen or purchase music, the majority of Internet music sites
are illegitimate, featuring music publicized online without permission from
the copyright holder. Moreover, the Internet often leaves the music industry
without copyright infringement remedies since Webmasters cannot be
located without significant costs and Web users are often too removed from
the initial infringement.
Because the recording industry seeks to protect its copyrights from
Internet piracy, it also has encountered adversity dealing with companies
that produce devices that encourage or simplify piracy. One such device is
the Rio PMP 300 (Rio), a hand-held device manufactured by Diamond
Multimedia Systems, Inc., which makes portable MP3 files downloadable
from the Internet. Although the Rio has no output capability-it is not able
to generate copies-it stores music on removable memory cards, which
creates another method enabling people to purchase, trade, or obtain pirated
music.' Because of the Rio's functioning capacity and its lack of certain
copyright protection devices, the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) 2 filed a lawsuit against Diamond Multimedia in 1998
seeking to enjoin Diamond from selling and distributing the Rio.
This Note examines some of the factors that influence portable MP3
technology, and the MP3 impact on copyright protection and fair use. Part
II of this Note discusses the case of Recording Industry Association of
America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. (Rio),3 where the RIAA
opposed a portable music player manufactured by Diamond Multimedia
because the device lacked anticopying mechanisms, and Diamond
Multimedia refused to pay royalties to the RIAA from the sale and use of
1. See RIAA Sues over Internet Music Recorder, CONSUMER MULTIMEDIA REPORT,
Oct. 19, 1998, at 2, available at 1998 WL 11069328.
2. The RIAA, as the largest association of recording artists, includes the five largest
recording labels in America, including Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., BMG
Entertainment, EMI-Recorded Music, Universal Music Group, and Warner Group. Its total
sales account for almost 90% of all music sales each year.
3. 180 F.3d 1072 (1999).
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copyright-protected music. Although the court decided the case under the
Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA),4 the case involved copyright
issues concerning unauthorized copying and payment of royalties.
Therefore, for the purpose of this Note, Part II reclassifies Rio as a case
falling directly under the Copyright Act of 1976. Part I presents the case
as a fair use question and discusses the courts' treatment of the four factors
of fair use under section 107 of the Copyright Act. Part IV examines the
Rio case under a fair use analysis, focusing on whether the Rio user has a
fair use defense in an infringement action by copyright holders. Finally,
Part V discusses how the fair use argument could affect the music industry.
II. RECORDING INDUSTRYASSOCIATION OF AMERICA V. DIAMOND
MULTIMEDIA SYSTEMS, INC.
Music sound files are readily available online in MPEG 1 Layer 3
(MP3) format, a technology that compresses digital sound files. MP3 has
the capability of compressing an audio file by a factor of twelve to one
without significantly reducing the sound quality of the music.5 This is an
attractive format for Internet users because it is available for anyone to use,
and it permits large amounts of information to be stored on a relatively
small amount of computer space. Such ease in locating, distributing, and
storing should prompt the music industry to embrace the new technology
and expand its sales and marketing methods, but the recording industry has
instead been reluctant to market MP3 sales because of the increased
6potential for music piracy and bootlegging.
Already, the music industry estimates that it loses over five million
dollars each year to music piracy7 because of number of illegitimate Web
sites that feature copyright-protected music without the permission of the
copyright owner. Oftentimes, college students or oversea Internet users
4. 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
5. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d
1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 1999).
6. See Don Jeffrey, Role, Growth of Online Retailing Discussed at NARM Confab,
BILLBOARD, Oct. 3, 1998, at 66. Bootlegging is the practice in which a person produces an
unauthorized copy of a commercially unreleased performance. See Dowling v. United
States, 473 U.S. 207, 209-10 n.2 (1985). This is distinguished from piracy, by which a
person produces an unauthorized copy of a performance that has already been released
commercially. See iaL Although Rio primarily addressed music piracy, the discussion in this
Note will focus on both piracy and bootlegging because the development of the recordable
compact disc (CD) player, CD burner, and CD-R largely expand the ability for bootleggers
to create digital copies of concert performances, television appearances, and other "out
takes," which can then be digitally copied as easily as music already embodied in digital
format.
7. See Jeffrey, supra note 6, at 66.
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maintain such Web sites by uploading the audio files from personal CD
collections and placed on a personal Web site for friends and others to
enjoy. While the RIAA, fights to eliminate illegitimate music sites on the
Internet, new sites pop up each day to replace the sites that have been
eliminated, and the recording industry is simply unable to police and close
down the many illegitimate sites. As a result, despite the fact that legitimate
Internet music sales totaled over thirty-six million dollars in 1997, the
RIAA still asserts that the Internet distribution of pirate copies will
discourage the purchase of legitimate recordings." The RIAA further
predicts that revenues lost to Internet piracy will soon surpass money lost
through all other forms of piracy combined.9
A. Ninth Circuit Case Interpretation
In October 1998, the RIAA filed a lawsuit in California seeking to
enjoin Diamond Multimedia from the distribution and sale of a portable
device-the Rio-capable of storing and replaying digital audio files
transferred from the hard drive of a personal computer.'0 Specifically, the
RIAA alleged that the Rio violated the AHRA," which requires all digital
audio recording devices to be equipped with certain copyright protection
devices, including a system that monitors and manages the copying ability
of the device and a royalties provision.
The Rio, a small hand-held device, functions like a walkman or
portable CD player. Users can play music through the Rio and listen to it
using headphones. Prior to the Rio, listeners of MP3 audio files listened to
the music though headphones or speakers at their computers. The Rio,
however, makes listening to MP3 files portable.
A user of the Rio downloads MP3 files from the Internet or from his
or her personal computer where CDs have been transferred. The MP3 files
can then be transferred onto a flash memory card playable in the Rio. 3
These cards can hold about sixty minutes of music or sixteen hours of
spoken material. 4 Users can add a flash memory card to store up to an
additional hour of music, 5 or they can purchase additional flash memory
8. See id. at 65.
9. See Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 180 F.3d at 1074. Currently, the RIAA
alleges that it loses $300 million to other traditional forms of piracy.
10. See id. at 1072.
11. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
12. See Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 180 F.3d at 1074.
13. See id. at 1074-75.
14. See id. at 1075.
15. See id.
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cards to hold a different sixty-minute set of music to play in the user's Rio
or another Rio.
Like the walkman and CD player, the Rio has no audio output
capability; 6 the device can play back music but it cannot record music.
Still, the Rio surpasses the older devices in various respects. Unlike the
walkman, which allows a user only to play analog audio tapes, the Rio
plays digital music. The result is a crisper, cleaner recording more true to
the original recording sound than an analog copy. In addition, unlike the
portable CD player, which also plays digital music, the Rio has no moving
parts. This means that the listener will enjoy music free of any skips,
repeats, or other interruptions caused by any shock to a normal portable CD
player.
In the lawsuit against Diamond Multimedia, the RIAA alleged that
the Rio did not meet the requirements for a digital audio recording device
under the AHRA.1 7 Specifically, the RJAA alleged that the Rio did not
employ the required Serial Copyright Management System (SCMS),' s and
that Diamond Multimedia owed royalties under the Act as the manufacturer
and distributor of a digital audio recording device."
To determine whether the Rio violated the AHRA, the court had to
decide whether the Rio was a digital audio recording device. The AHRA
defines a "digital audio recording device" as:
16. See RIAA Sues over Internet Music Recorder, supra note 1, at 2.
17. See Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 180 F.3d at 1075.
18. Section 1002(a) of the AHRA requires that all digital audio recording devices be
equipped with the SCMS or a functionally equivalent system. The SCMS generates certain
copyright information which it sends, receives, and acts upon to prevent unauthorized
copying. See 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (1994). Its central purpose is to minimize copying of
copies, permitting a first-generation copy to be made from the original, while preventing
copies produced from that first-generation copy. See Malcolm Maclachlan, Digital Music
Needs Copyright Protection, TEcHWEB NEws, Oct. 22, 1998, at 1-2, available in LEXIS,
News Group File. Although the SCMS does prevent second-generation copying and beyond,
it is not without flaws, because it will not prevent infinite first-generation copies from being
produced from the original phonorecord.
19. Section 1003 requires any person who imports and distributes, or manufactures and
distributes, any digital audio recording device to give notice to the Register of Copyrights
with respect to the device, and to make royalty payments for the device. See 17 U.S.C. §
1003 (1994). The AHRA also states the royalty payment due is two percent of the transfer
price and limits the requirement of payment only to the first person to manufacture and
distribute the device. See 17 U.S.C. § 1004(a)(1) (1994). This provision was essentially a
compromise by the music industry for sales lost to the home taping of analog music, but if
applicable to devices like the Rio, would also compensate musicians for lost sales due to
Internet music piracy. See R!AA Wins Restraining Order on Rio Portable, CONStMER
ELwroNIcs NEwsLErmr, Oct. 19, 1998, at 2, available at 1998 WL 10716444; Tracey
Snell, MP3 Player Comes to UK as US Legal Fight Begins, Music WK., Oct. 24, 1998, at 6,
available at 1998 WL 11882859.
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[A]ny machine or device of a type commonly distributed to individuals
for use by individuals, whether or not included with or as part of some
other machine or device, the digital recording function of which is
designed or marketed for the primary purpose of, and that is capable
20
of, making a digital audio copied recording for private use.
A "digital audio copied recording" is defined by the AHRA as "a
reproduction in a digital recording format of a digital music recording,
whether that reproduction is made directly from another digital music
recording or indirectly from a transmission. 2 ' A "digital musical
recording" is defined as:
[A] material object-
(i) in which are fixed, in a digital recording format, only sounds,
and material, statements, or instructions incidental to those fixed
sounds, if any, and
(ii) from which the sounds and material can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device.22
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Rio was not a digital
audio recording device because it recorded from a computer hard drive,
which Congress exempted from the AHRA since the hard drives contain
more than "only sounds, and material, statements, or instructions incidental
to those fixed sounds. 23 Moreover, the Act excluded from the term "digital
musical recording" a material object "in which one or more computer
programs are fixed."24 Although this holding appeared to create a loophole
by simply passing the music through a computer and allowing the file to
reside momentarily on the hard drive, the court determined that the AHRA
made this evasion permissible by design.25 Finally, the Rio was not a digital
audio recording device because it could not reproduce a digital music
recording from a transmission.
B. The Rio Case as a Fair Use Issue
Having determined that the Rio was not a digital audio recording
device, the court did not subject the Rio to the AHRA's requirements and
had no need for further examination. The court stated, however, that the
Rio "merely makes copies in order to render portable, or space-shift those
20. 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3) (1994).
21. Id. § 1001(1).
22. Id. § 1001(5)(A)(i)-(ii).
23. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072,
1076 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1001(5)(A)).
24. Id.
25. See id. at 1078.
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files that already reside on a user's hard drive,"26 thereby analogizing the
use of the Rio for space-shifting purposes to Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc. (Betamax),27 where the court held that video
taping television shows for the purpose of time-shifting was a permissible
use under the Copyright Act. The Betamax court stated that "such copying
is paradigmatic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent with the
purpose of the Act."
'
Because the court had no occasion to look at the Rio case from a fair
use perspective, this Note examines the case as one of fair use to reach the
same conclusion as the Ninth Circuit. Downloading files from the
Internet-even pirated files-for the purposes of placing such files on the
Rio to listen to MP3 files away from a personal computer is a fair use under
the Copyright Act. Because the court has had only few occasions to
examine copyright issues on the Internet and none pertain directly to the
issue of fair use, Part IV of this Note analogizes this case to other fair use
cases involving newly developed technology. Thus, the next section
discusses the historical development of the fair use doctrine as it relates to
new technologies.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FAIR USE
Folsom v. Marsh was the first case to introduce the doctrine of fair
use, an affirmative defense to a copyright infringement suit, to American
jurisprudence. In Folsom, the court permitted the copying of numerous
works included in the plaintiff's copyrighted biography of George
Washington. In finding that the copying was a permissible use--despite the
prima facie showing of copyright infringement-the court looked to the
following factors: (1) the nature and objectives of the selections made; (2)
the quantity and value (quality) of materials used; and (3) the degree to
which the use may prejudice the sale by the plaintiff or diminish the
plaintiff's profits."' Congress later codified these factors in section 107 of
the Copyright Act of 1976, which reads as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair
use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in
copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that
section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether
26. Id. at 1079.
27. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
28. Id. at 447.
29. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
30. See id. at 344.
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the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to
be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.
It is important to note that by codifying the doctrine of fair use, the
legislature only intended to recognize the privilege statutorily, to "restate
the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it
in any way. 32 In the litany of cases decided after codification of section
107, the court continued to examine the applicability of the fair use defense
on a case-by-case basis. This, coupled with the common law tradition of
fair use adjudication, best demonstrate the Congress's intention. The next
parts focus on fair use cases involving newly developed technologies,
specifically the video cassette recorder (VCR) and the photocopier.
A. Video Recording Technology and Fair Use
In Betamax,33 the Court examined the fair use defense as it related to
the manufacturer of a videotape recorder capable of copyright
infringement.3 Sony manufactured the Betamax, a home VCR capable of,
among other things, playing back already-taped video cassettes or
recording television programs. 5 Universal Studios brought a copyright
infringement lawsuit against Sony, alleging that the sale of the VCR that
permitted users to record television programs broadcast on public airwaves
(of which Universal owned some copyrights) constituted copyright
36infringement by Sony.
To reach the conclusion that recording television programs was a fair
use under the Copyright Act, the Court first noted several characteristics of
the Betamax technology. Among other things, the Betamax allowed users
to record one program while viewing another program. Also, video tapes
used in recording could be reused or erased before or after viewing the
recorded program. Finally, the VCR could function on a timer system so
31. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
32. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976).
33. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
34. See id.
35. See id. at 422.
36. See id. at 420.
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users could record programs when away from home.37 Thus, the Court
found that the central purpose for a consumer to tape a publicly broadcast
television program was to time-shift, or "to record a program he cannot
view as it is being televised and then to watch it once at a later time.
''31
Despite this finding, however, the Court also took note of several surveys
that showed that a substantial number of Betamax users did not simply
view the recorded program once and erase or record over it, but rather
accumulated tapes to create personal video libraries .39 Nevertheless, the
Court found this to be a permissible use under the fair use doctrine,
engaging in the four-factor analysis established in section 107 of the
Copyright Act.
First, under the purpose and character of the use, the Court found that
recording programs to view them later time in the privacy of the user's
home was a noncommercial use acting in favor of fair use.40 Moreover, this
use "increas[ed] access to television programming," furthering the First
Amendment's goal of disseminating information to the fullest extent.41
Second, although courts generally disfavor entertainment uses under
the fair use doctrine, 42 many copyright holders would not object to the
Betamax users taping programs for home viewing at a later time. It
provided television viewers the opportunity to watch the holders'
43programs, supported a finding of fair use.
Under the third factor for determining fair use-the amount and
substantiality of the portion used-the defense loses its effectiveness when
the user copies the entire work, rather than only portions of a work, because
the excessive copying can displace the original.44 The Court found that
although Betamax users would record television programs in their entirety,
the court lessened the importance of this factor because in order to make
taping meaningful, the program would have to be recorded in its entirety. 5
37. See id. at 422-23.
38. Id. at 421.
39. See id. at 423-24.
40. See id. at 425.
41. Id.
42. See id.; see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963,
971-72 (9th Cir. 1981). Fair use is disfavored when the copying is not a "productive use."
"[Wjhen the copyrighted material is reproduced for its intrinsic use, the mass copying of the
sort involved... precludes the application of fair use." Id.
43. See Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 424. Many of the copyright holders that did not
object to copying televised programs offered programming dedicated to sports events,
religious teaching, and education.
44. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432,438 (9th Cir. 1986).
45. See Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 425-26.
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Finally, the Court found that the effect, if any, on the market for or
the value of the copyrighted works would not be significant. The Court
based this determination on consumer surveys reporting no significant
decrease in regular television viewing, despite the introduction of the VCR,
and on Universal's inability to demonstrate the likelihood of harm.46
Additionally, the Court noted that time-shifting enlarges the television
viewing audience.47
The Court emphasized that Universal broadcast the televised material
free of charge, users record the material for noncommercial purposes, and
users conduct the infringing activity (recording the programs and viewing
481them later) solely within the privacy of their homes. Moreover, the user
could employ the Betamax for a number of noninfringing purposes,
including the authorized use of a copyrighted work or creation of new
works. Finally, the Court analogized the copyright issue of contributory
infringement presented to patent law, finding that articles or commodities
suitable for substantial noninfringing use do not contributorily infringe.49
Thus, the Court found that "the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of
other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if
the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes."50
From this case arose the "Sony presumption," a presumption against
fair use when copies are made for commercial or profit-making purposes.5'
Where use of the copyrighted work is a noncommercial use, on the other
hand, the plaintiff must prove either that the particular use was harmful or
that it could adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted
work.
52
The Court in the Betamax case confined its holding to the issue of
private home use of the VCR for recording programs broadcast on public
airwaves at no charge to the viewer.53 As a result, the Court did not address
other issues concerning use of the VCR for infringing purposes, including
"the transfer of tapes to other persons, the use of home-recorded tapes for
public performances, or the copying of programs transmitted on pay or
cable television systems."54Although the Betamax court did not address this
last concern, scholars have observed that the central holding of the case still
46. See id. at 454.
47. See id. at 421.
48. See id. at 425.
49. See id. at 439-42.
50. Id. at 442.
51. See id. at 449.
52. See id. at 451.
53. See id. at 425.
54. Id.
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applies when a user records a program televised on pay or cable television
for private home use for time-shifting purposes.5
Contrary to Betamax, the district court in Encyclopaedia Britannica
Education Corp. v. Crooks56 held that a school board engaging in large-
scale videotape copying of copyrighted works taken from publicly televised
airways did not constitute fair use. In that case, the school board
maintained a video library of educational videotapes containing protected
works and copied the videos upon request by teachers. 7 The school board
made copies available either free of charge or for a nominal fee, allowing
58teachers to engage in time-shifting of the educational programs.
Examining this type of copying, the court held that the fair use
defense was not available. Even though courts apply the fair use privilege
more liberally in noncommercial and nonprofit educational situations,59 "'a
highly organized and systematic program for reproducing videotapes on a
massive scale"' is not a permissible use under section 107.6
Utilizing the four fair use factors, the court acknowledged that the use
of the work supported a finding of fair use based on the educational value
derived from the infringement.6' Turning to the Senate Report on the
Copyright Act of 1976, however, the court found that:
[T]he fair use doctrine would apply to a teacher who acts individually
in making one or more copies for temporary use in classroom teaching
but that
[a] different result is indicated where the cog'ing was done by an
educational institution... or larger unit....
Moreover, the court found that the amount of copying exceeded any
reasonable amount permissible under the fair use defense. 63 Finally,
because the copyrighted works could be easily be acquired lawfully by
other methods, the school board's actions weighed against fair use.64
Although the court recognized that-under the second factor-the
educational value of the works may justify copying, the court emphasized
the need to limit the amount of copying to preserve the works' original
55. See, e.g., Joni Lupovitz, Beyond Betamax and Broadcast: Home Recording from
Pay Television and the Fair Use Doctrine, 2 FORDHAM INTEL. PRop. & MEDIA ENT. L.J.
69, 88 (1992).
56. 542 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
57. See id. at 1163.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 1168.
60. 1d. at 1169 (citation omitted).
61. See id. at 1174.
62. Id. at 1175 (quoting S. REP. No. 94-473, at 63 (1975)).
63. See id.
64. See id. at 1176.
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value. 65 Because the school board copied programs in their entirety and
often retained the copies for several years, the court, considering the third
factor, found that the substantiality of copying weighed against fair use
since it essentially created a substitution for the purchase of a license for
66the copyrighted work.
The court found that the fourth factor was the most significant.
Interference with the marketability of the plaintiff's work, or "the
cumulative effect of mass reproduction ... [which] tends to diminish the
potential market for the copyright holders' works ' 67 weighed against
finding fair use. With the technological development of the VCR, the
school board could engage in a mass reproduction scheme that essentially
replaced the need for the original work without contributing a new work or
a new element to the existing work. Thus, the court found that the school
board's use of videotaping for time-shifting purposes was not permissible
in this case.
B. Photocopying and Fair Use
Another method for determining the applicability of the fair use
defense arises under a doctrine known as productive use or transformative
use. The court applied the transformative use doctrine in American
681Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc. In that case, the American
Geophysical Union (AGU) was the copyright holder of various scientific
and technical journals. Texaco was a profit-seeking corporation employing
research scientists.69 Although Texaco subscribed to numerous journals-
many of which AGU published-many of the corporation's scientists
photocopied some of the journal articles to keep in their personal fies,
rather than simply reading the articles in the library. 70 The employees used
the photocopies for their personal knowledge, future use, or laboratory
research work.7' This practice has several advantages. It kept the original
journal free for others to access and allowed scientists to easily reference
pertinent articles. It also helped avoid unnecessary, repeated, and time-
consuming trips to the library and eliminated the risk of transcription error
(if the article would be studied and notes taken instead of photocopying).
Finally, it gave the scientist portability by allowing him to take only a small
65. See id. at 1177-79.
66. See id. at 1179.
67. Id. at 1169.
68. 802 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
69. See id. at 4.
70. See id.
71. See id.
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articles into a laboratory instead of large volumes and preserved the
original while allowing the scientist to make notations in the margins of
"his copy.' 72
Despite all these advantages and useful reasons for photocopying, the
court found that this practice was not a fair use of the AGU's copyrighted
journals. The court reasoned that photocopying deprived AGU of the
ability to sell additional subscriptions, conflicting with copyright
protection's purpose.
If authors are guaranteed the opportunity to profit from their writings,
they will have an incentive to create, and the public will ultimately
reap the resulting expansion of human knowledge. In contrast, if no
copyright protection were granted and others were permitted to copy
freely works of authorship, authors would find it difficult to earn a
living from their writings; their energies would be diverted to other
pursuits ... consequently, the public's right to appropriate the works
of authors would make the public poorer through the loss of the benefit
of authors' endeavors.
74
The court then moved to the four-factor analysis under the fair use defense
in section 107 of the Copyright Act.
While evaluating the first factor, the court noted a preference for
secondary uses that did not merely copy and offer themselves as substitutes
for the original copyrighted text, but that used the matter taken from the
copyrighted work for some new objective or purpose.75 The court also
emphasized that although Texaco's employees copied the articles in their
entirety, the focus of the first-factor analysis lies on the "object of the
selections made... and the degree [of use]" by the infringing party, rather
than a mere quantitative analysis. 76 The court then acknowledged the
Betamax holding, which indicated that a nonproductive but noncommercial
72. Id.
73. See id. at 28.
74. Id. at 9.
75. See id. at 11. This theory, the transformative use doctrine, is based largely on the
preamble language of section 107. It argues for protection for productive uses of
copyrighted works, even if infringing uses, because they confer some benefit on the public
by adding a new socially valuable creative element. See LEONE. SELTZE, EXEMMONS AND
FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 24 (1978). Nonproductive or reproductive uses occur where the user
copies the material to use it for the same intrinsic purpose for which the copyright owner
intended it to be used. See MARsHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 320
(2d ed. 1995). Such uses do not contribute anything new or beneficial to the public. Thus,
the fair use privilege should be limited to situations where a productive use has been made
of the copyrighted work. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 478 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also LEAFEER, supra 75, at 321.
76. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. at 11.
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use might be a fair use, but that a nonproductive use for commercial or
profit-making purposes would be presumptively unfair.77
While finding that Texaco's copying was commercial because its
purposes were "to create new products and processes for Texaco that will
improve its competitiveness and profitability,' 78 the court ultimately
rejected the Sony presumption and focused on the four-factor analysis. It
found that Texaco's use was not transformative because its purpose was to
"supersede the original and permit duplication. 79 Moreover, this type of
copying added nothing new or different to the original work.80
Under the second factor, the court found in favor of fair use. First, the
court noted that scientific articles have a strong claim to protection from
copying but do not have a strong claim as to their secretive quality.81 In
other words, scientific knowledge without dissemination would conflict
with the purpose of copyright protection to promote the progress of
science. The court also found, however, that factual works, such as
scientific works, had a large scope for fair use.82 Thus, the court concluded
that the second factor favored Texaco.
On the other hand, the court quickly noted that the third factor clearly
weighed against Texaco since the employees copied the entire article.8'
Although the amount of copying was small in a comparison to the length of
the articles and the length of the journal, the court emphasized that each
article had individual copyright protection.
Given Texaco's numerous alternatives to provide its scientists with
copies of articles for their files, such as purchasing additional subscriptions
or negotiating licensing agreements to photocopy, the court found against
Texaco on the fourth factor.85
Finally, the court weighed equitable considerations and found in favor
of the AGU. Distinguishing the Betamax holding, the court did not find
nonproductive copying a fair use because the use by Texaco's scientists
was neither private nor noncommercial.86 Here, unlike in the Betamax case,
the use was not personal use since its purpose benefited the employer.
87
77. See id. at 12.
78. Id. at 16.
79. Id. at 13.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 16.
82. See id. at 16-17.
83. See id. at 17.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 18.
86. See id. at 22.
87. See id. at 6.
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Additionally, the Texaco court found that photocopying by a large number
of scientists at a large corporation deprived AGU of substantial revenues
that could have been earned through the sale of additional subscriptions or
licensing arrangements." This, too, differed from the Betamax case, where
the Supreme Court found that time-shifting caused no economic loss to the
copyright owners.
The holding in Texaco is often compared with Williams & Wilkins
Co. v. United States,89 a preceding case in which the court held that
photocopying entire articles from medical journals by medical researchers
was a fair use. In that case, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, through the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the National
Library of Medicine (NLM), made unauthorized copies of articles from
Williams & Wilkins's copyrighted medical journals. 0
The library received two copies of each of the journals involved.
When the subscriptions did not satisfy the demand for the journals, the
library ran a photocopy service for its research staff.9' The library instituted
several policies to prevent abusive photocopying, such as limiting copying
requests to approximately fifty pages of a single article, rejecting requests
for copies of articles deemed "widely available," and limiting the number
of requests each individual staff researcher can make.92 If the library met
the researchers' requests, the researchers retained the photocopied articles
in their personal files for future reference.93
Despite the seeming similarities between Williams & Wilkins and
Texaco, the court found that this type of photocopying was permissible
under the fair use doctrine because Williams & Wilkins could show no
harm as a result of the copying94 and because prohibiting copying would
hinder medical research.95 In reaching this determination, the court focused
on several factors: (1) NIL and NLM were nonprofit organizations and
were not seeking profit or commercial gain from the photocopying; (2) the
researchers obtaining the copies had no purpose to duplicate the copies for
88. See id. at 22.
89. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
90. See id. at 1346-47.
91. See id. at 1347-48.
92. See id. at 1348-49.
93. See id. at 1348.
94. The court based its conclusion that photocopying would not result in economic
harm to the plaintiffs in part on the fact that journal subscribership had increased over the
years, and also on the fact that the library had engaged in this type of photocopying with
"apparent general acceptance" since before the Copyright Act of 1909 came into existence.
Id. at 1355-56.
95. See id. at 1354.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
sale or other distribution; (3) the copies were useful to the researchers'
work; and (4) rather than attempting to misappropriate work, the copying
was merely an effort to gain easier access to research materials.96
So why the different results in Williams & Wilkins and Texaco?
Noting that, since the decision in Williams & Wilkins, the practice of
photocopying has increased vastly, the court in Texaco stated that "[t]he
monumental change since the decision of Williams & Wilkins in 1973 has
been the cooperation of users and publishers to create workable solutions to
the problem."97 Unlike the Texaco case, where licensing arrangements and
the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) made negotiating for photocopying
faster and easier, the Texaco court noted that at the time of the Williams &
Wilkins decision, such services and practices did not exist and negotiating
each time a researcher needed a photocopy of an article would have been
inconvenient, expensive, and time consuming. 98
Moreover, the Texaco court emphasized several benefits found in
Williams & Wilkins not present in the present case. First, the AGU did not
suffer economic harm by the photocopying practices. Second, medical
research would be seriously hurt if the court prohibited photocopying.
Third, the court could not devise a remedy for the infringement without
exceeding its judicial authority. Fourth, the libraries in Williams & Wilkins
were nonprofit institutions and were not attempting to gain financially from
the photocopying. Fifth, the researchers needed the copies for scientific
work and did not intend to sell or distribute the copies. Finally, the
enterprise of duplication served scientific progress.99
Although many of these factors do not seem distinguishable between
the two cases, it appears that-with the possible exception of Texaco' -
advances in technology that make it easier to copy and disseminate material
generally extend the fair use privilege to otherwise infringing uses. Thus,
new technologies will often limit the rights of copyright owners.
96. See id.
97. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
98. See id.
99. See id. at 23.
100. One possible reason Texaco came out against fair use, unlike Betamax and Williams
& Wilkins, is that by 1992, the photocopier, although faster, cheaper, and easier to use, was
no longer a "new" technology. Coupled with the court's observation that other relatively
attainable methods for negotiating for authorization to make the copies were available, the
holding in Texaco differed from cases finding fair use more based on societal development,
and perhaps less on the four fair use factors.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF FAIR USE UNDER THE Rio CASE
In light of the courts' holdings in some fair use cases concerning new
technology, if the court examined the Rio case as a fair use issue, it is likely
the copyright infringers would benefit from the fair use defense. The most
likely theory under which a fair use defense would be pursued would be
one of "space-shifting." Similar to time-shifting, space-shifting simply
permits a user to record a program (here, a music file) and listen to it at a
more convenient time in a more convenient place. Of course, obvious
problems exist in analogizing the Rio case to past fair use cases because the
level of technology the court confronts in Rio far surpassed what courts
faced in other cases. Still, the court is determining fair use in light of new
technology, rather than the degree of advancement of technology, making
the analogous argument possible.
Although the Betamax case did not address the copyright violation
liability of the person actually videotaping the programs, and the Williams
& Wilkins and Texaco cases did not address the liability of the infringing
employees, it seems apparent that initiating an infringement action against
such users would be difficult and futile since the copyright holder will
rarely be able to identify these persons. However, no court has ever
specifically exempted such persons from an infringement action on the
ground that it would be difficult to pursue them. Likewise, the Rio user will
be difficult to track, since he or she is not the person engaging in direct
infringement by placing pirated music on the Web. The recording industry
will be unable to determine which users download pirated MP3 files onto
their Rios since this function is done entirely offline between the
computer's hard drive and the Rio itself. Unless some type of information
is collected from the user before he downloads an MP3 file, the industry
will not even know who downloads the files. Although the use of Rio has
undisputed copyright infringement abilities, Rio users should be permitted
to assert a fair use defense in an infringement action in light of the four-
factor analysis set forth in the Betamax case.
A. Purpose and Character of the Use
Like the Betamax case, here the user conducts the infringing activity
entirely within the user's home. An Internet user downloads an MP3 file
onto his or her computer and transfers it to the Rio to enjoy at a later time
in a different location. The private nature of this activity weighs in favor of
fair use.
Second, analogous to the copying in Williams & Wilkins, the purpose
of the Rio is to listen to music in a portable manner not to reproduce
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multiple copies of the music for sale or other distribution.' °' Because each
user customizes flash memory cards, a reproduced flash memory cards
carries little value, since each listener will likely want to produce his or her
own individualized cards. Moreover, since the Rio has no output capability
and reproductions of the cards can only be made by an analog dub though a
headphone jack,'02 the digital quality of the MP3 file will not survive
reproduction and the sound quality will be lost, reducing the demand for
already-programmed flash memory cards.
0 3
Next, like uses of copyrighted material in Williams & Wilkins and
Betamax, the use of the MP3 files by the Rio user are private and
noncommercial.O" While a commercial use by the person originally placing
the music on the Internet would weigh against a finding of fair use, in most
cases of music piracy on the Internet, the person placing the music on the
Internet is not seeking to sell the music, but rather only to make it available
to those wishing to listen to or download it. Moreover, this commercial
nature should not affect the Rio user, who lies downstream in the copyright
violation scheme. Thus, the noncommercial nature of Rio flash memory
cards weighs in favor of fair use.
As far as retaining the unauthorized copies, the Rio scenario falls
closer to the situation in Betamax, rather than in Williams & Wilkins and
Texaco. While videotapes can be erased and reused and the flash memory
cards for the Rio cannot be erased, users will likely retain the cards only for
short periods of time and will soon try the selections on the card, merely
record over (but not erase) them, and produce a new set of portable MP3
files. Users probably will not store flash memory cards like photocopies
because of the short life span of popular music and expensive quality of the
cards themselves. The unauthorized use of MP3 files will be short-lived,
and as a result, the first factor weighs in favor of fair use.
B. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
In the Betamax case, the taped televised programs at issue were
placed on public airwaves at no charge to the viewer. In the case of the Rio,
101. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
102. See RIAA Sues Over Internet Music Recorder, supra note 1, at 2.
103. This argument also falls within the four-factor analysis, but will not be discussed
here again.
104. The marketability of flash memory cards as a commercial use, or lack thereof, is
also discussed under the four factor-analysis of fair use, infra Part IV, but Rio technology
contemplates that users will make flash memory cards for their personal use, much like the
Betamax user tapes a program for his or her personal use. While the tape may be shared
with others, such occurrences are likely minimal among VCR users, as they will be with Rio
users, such that the court in Betamax was not particularly concerned with this use.
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the material is also, arguably, placed on the Internet free of charge. The
user has no control over what information already exists on the Internet and
merely uncovers it by Internet surfing (like channel surfing on television).
Of course, it matters who originally placed the copyrighted material online,
but the Rio user commits no greater infringement by taking pirated music
off the Internet and reproducing it than he does if he reproduces licensed
MP3 files. It can also be argued that because the Internet user must pay for
Internet service, the material is not provided free of charge. However, this
argument presents a case similar to a VCR user taping a cable or pay TV
program, and such actions have been implicitly permitted under the
Betamax holding.' °s
Although the holding in Betamax and the transformative doctrine
indicate that copying for entertainment purposes generally weighs against
fair use, such use can be favored if it contributes to a new or transformative
use of the work. 16 In Betamax, the court found the use permissible despite
the entertainment nature of the work because several copyright holders
would not object to the use even though the user did not obtain permission
to copy the work.1°7 Similarly, many musical artists and copyright holders
to musical works would not object to their work being downloaded off the
Internet and would instead view it as an opportunity to increase the public's
access to their music.'Os Finally, in light of the possible music
manipulations that are not possible in videotaping, such as parody and
remakes, MP3 files (and obtainment of them by the Rio user) may help
facilitate these transformative uses of the original work. Thus, the second
factor can weigh in favor of fair use.
C. Amount and Substantiality of the Work Used in Relation to the
Copyrighted Work as a Whole
Like the other fair use cases discussed in Part M that involved
copying in entirety, a Rio user will record or download MP3 files in their
entirety as well. This could consist of piecemeal recording-recording
individualized tracks off the Internet-or recording an entire album. This
ability weighs against a finding of fair use since each song on an album has
105. See Lupovitz, supra note 55, at 88.
106. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 971-72 (9th
Cir. 1981).
107. This reasoning is also discussed more completely under the fourth factor of fair use
infra Part IV.D.
108. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc, 464 U.S. 417, 425 (1984)
(encouraging fair use where the infringement increased public access to information).
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separate marketability in addition to marketability of the entire album.
Therefore, this factor weighs against a finding of fair use.
D. Effect of the Use on the Potential Market for and Value of the
Copyrighted Work
Like the VCR in the Betamax case or the photocopier in Williams &
Wilkins, although the Rio is capable of infringing uses, it is also capable of
substantial noninfringing uses. Like the copyright holders of television
programs that do not object to the taping of their programs, many musical
artists would not object to users downloading their music for use with the
Rio. Because of the Rio's limited capabilities, music listeners will still
remain interested in purchasing CDs to use with their other music
equipment, and the availability of MP3 files may actually increase records
sales.
Several artists have embraced MP3 technology because it provides an
affordable and easy method by which they can disseminate sound clips or
select tracks from their records, encouraging listeners to sample the music
inducing legitimate sales of the CD.'09 Indeed, others have utilized the
availability of MP3 files to actually profit by selling the files themselves
over the Internet.
As in Betamax, where Universal was unable to show that home
videotaping would result in decreased regular television viewing, here the
recording industry will also only be able to speculate as to damages,
alleging that Internet piracy will decrease legitimate sales of CDs or
legitimate purchases of MP3 files. While the recording industry has figures
representing the estimated sales lost generally to music piracy, it cannot
show that the Rio specifically will contribute to these losses.
Thus, the recording industry's attack on the Rio and similar devices
likely represents an attack on technology, as opposed to an attack on the
users who utilize the technology to harm others."0 As a result and for the
reasons indicated above, the recording industry would likely fail in a
copyright infringement suit against the users of the Rio and similar devices.
V. CONCLUSION
Although piracy currently presents copyright infringement problems
for the music industry, because the fair use defense is available to those
with access to the pirated music, the recording industry can use new
109. See Michael Colton, More Piracy of the High C's? The Recording Industry Wages
War Against the Rio, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1998, at G5.
110. See Neil Gross, Target Pirates-Not Technology, Bus. WK., Nov. 2, 1998, at 40.
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technology to its advantage. Many people in the music industry predict that
MP3 files will soon replace the CD. This opens the door for a new market
where the recording industry can sell its products in addition to its current
marketing methods, leading eventually to an entire virtual music store. The
music industry would be wise to learn from the Betamax technology, which
increased marketability of copyrighted works in the long run by creating a
market for videotape rentals, sales, video sequels and the like, instead of
suppressing the marketability for copyrighted works simply because a VCR
owner could record a program. MP3 files and devices like the Rio can
create new markets for the music industry, while maintaining a demand for
existing music products (CDs, tapes, etc.) and increasing overall sales.

